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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
KANAWHA AND HOCKING COAL
AND COKE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-vs. -

Case No.

CARBON COUNTY, a municipal corporation, and CENTENNIAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

13853

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a quiet title action.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The district court granted a summary judgment
determining appellant to be the owner of the title to
the surface of the property described in the complaint,
denying appellant's claim of ownership of the coal title,
and determining respondent Carbon County to be the
owner of the coal title subject to a mining lease granted
by it to respondent Centennial Development Company.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents seek affirmance of the ruling below.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts set out in appellant's brief
is accurate so far as it goes, but it is incomplete. Respondents accordingly submit the summary which follows.
The lands claimed in the complaint are coal lands
situated in Carbon County. Appellant (hereafter,
"Kanawha") was by stipulation substituted as plaintiff
during pendency of the action (R. 24), which had been
commenced initially by North American Coal Corporation. Kanawha's claim of title is based upon a record
chain of deeds pre-dating the tax titles mentioned below.
So far as concerns the surface, Kanawha's alleged ownership was not denied by the County or Centennial and
the district court accordingly adjudged Kanawha to be
the owner of the surface title (R. 56).
The pleadings of the County and Centennial deny
Kanawha's ownership of the coal and coal mining rights,
and allege ownership by the County subject to a mining
leasehold interest covering the coal title held by Centennial under a mining lease granted by the County. The
coal and coal mining rights were conveyed to the County
by auditor's tax conveyances, one made in 1937 as to a
portion of the property and another in 1949 as to the
remainder. These conveyances followed upon the nonpayment by Kanawha's predecessor of the property
taxes on the coal title, which in prior years had been
assessed separately from the surface title (R. 7). Kanawha's predecessor did not redeem the tax sales of the
coal title nor pay the separately assessed taxes on the
coal, but has for all years continued the payments of
the taxes on the surface title (R. 29).
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Kanawha's answers to interrogatories state that
there were procedural defects in the assessment and sale
procedures underlying the auditor's conveyances of the
coal title to the County, and make the claim that these
would invalidate the auditor's conveyances (R. 28-29).
For purposes of the motion for summary judgment in
the district court, invalidity as a matter of fact and law
was assumed (R. 38).
The discovery materials also reflect Kanawha's
assertion that it has maintained actual possession of the
surface through various grazing lessees and by grants of
surface rights of way (R. 29-30), and such surface possession thus was assumed below.
Kanawha admitted that no possessory act in relation to the coal has ever been performed by it or any
predecessor. No mining of coal was ever conducted by
Kanawha or its predecessors. Neither Kanawha nor its
predecessors ever explored the coal seam by drilling or
otherwise, nor physically entered the seam by shaft or
drift, nor exposed it by any removal of overburden or
other physical opening (R. 30). The record shows Kanawha's effort to obtain by discovery in this case the records or logs of Centennial's exploratory drill holes, and
the lower court's denial of such discovery on grounds
that such confidential information would not lead to
discovery of admissible evidence (R. 19).
The general property taxes have been assessed as
to the surface title separately from the coal. Since the
times of the non-payment of the property taxes on the
coal title which preceded the auditor's conveyances (1932
as to part and 1944 as to the remainder), Kanawha and
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its predecessors have paid the separately levied surface
taxes (R. 29), but no taxes on the coal. The property
tax on the coal, which is by law assessed by the Tax
Commission, has not been levied by the County since
the dates (1937 and 1949) of the auditor's conveyances
of the coal title to the County (R. 31). Kanawha has
never tendered payment of any of the taxes on the coal.
Kanawha's brief recites that its predecessor severed
the surface title from the mineral title by a deed delivered in 1932 to another, conveying the surface rights and
reserving to itself the coal rights. That same predecessor
was grantee of a conveyance back of the surface rights
in 1950 (Kanawha's brief, p. 3).
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD
PLANTIFF'S CLAIM T O THE COAL TITLE T O
BE BARRED BY LIMITATIONS.

The district court's decision was based on Sections
78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2, the statutes which prescribe the
four-year period of limitations applicable in tax title
litigation. Kanawha's position on this appeal is that the
four-year statute does not apply. The reasoning is: because of the assumed invalidity of the auditor's conveyances, there was no severance of the coal title from the
surface title; therefore, it is said, Kanawha's possession
of the surface constitutes "possession" of the coal. Such
possession, according to Kanawha's reasoning, defeats
the application of the four-year statute.
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The same argument was urged upon the district
court, and was correctly rejected by that court. There
are two basic defects in Kanawha's position: first, the
tax title limitations statute and the passage of many
years' time precludes the assertion that the tax title is
invalid; second, in any event, the "no severance" argument of Kanawha is not available to it, under Utah law,
in view of the history of the separate assessment and
taxation of the two estates, surface and coal, and their
actual severance by deed of Kanawha's predecessors.
Kanawha's argument has been put forward in almost identical terms in prior tax title litigation arising
under the four-year statute and this Court has explicitly
rejected it. In Hansen v. Morris, 3 U2d 310, 283 P2d
884 (1955), which upheld a tax title attacked by a
presale owner, this Court stated (283 P2d, at 886):
In holding such sections valid, we can see no
merit in any argument to the effect that if any of
the statutory steps necessary to perfect a tax title
have not been taken, such as failure to give notice
of sale, failure of the auditor to execute affidavits,
etc., compels the conclusion that title remains in
the record owner, hence no title passes, hence any
claim by the county and/or its grantee by tax deed
is invalid, hence the statute of limitations does
not apply. The same argument could be leveled
against other statutes of limitation where the
authorities have validated a situation where one
becomes the owner absolute of the property of
another, without conveyance of any kind, but
merely as an adjunct of the passage of time and
the performance of statutorily prescribed conditions. The same argument also could be leveled
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against the so-called prima facie statutes which
legitimize such shifting of unconveyed title by
permitting certain documents to establish, prima
facie, facts therein recited or the regularity of
proceedings theretofore had, where such prima
facie evidence is either not attacked or survives
an attack, even though later it develops that
occurrences prior to the adduction of such evidence would have prevented such shifting of title
had they been urged before such evidence was
adduced (citations omitted).
Since the Hansen holding, the Court's decisions have
followed it and have applied the tax title limitations
statute in accordance with its terms. Peterson v. Callister,
6 U2d 359, 313 P2d 814 (1957), aff'd on reh'g, 8 U2d
348, 334 P.2d 759; Pender v. Alix, 11 U2d 58, 354 P2d
1066 (1960); Layton v. Holt, 22 U2d 138, 449 P2d 986
(1969). The basic reasoning is applied in the Peterson
case in which the Court rejected the same argument,
stating (313 P2d, at 815):
Likewise, title technically may not have passed
here, but the record owner cannot assert his title
because of the statute's interdiction against asserting title or setting up defenses.
While the Kanawha brief quotes the statutes on
which the decision it appeals from is based, it does not
address the statutory argument respondents made to the
district court nor does it even mention the Utah cases
cited below in support. There is a striking absence of
Utah cases from Kanawha's brief. The cases it cites
from other jurisdictions are not in point because they do
not address the matter of the applicability of the con-
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trolling Utah statute nor take account of the governing
Utah precedents.
Kanawha's argument cannot succeed because its
obvious effect would be to read the four-year statute of
repose out of the Code. What the statute clearly says is
that a pre-tax sale owner situated as Kanawha is situated, admittedly not in possession of the mineral rights
and admittedly having paid no taxes on the separately
assessed mineral rights for many years, may not as a
plaintiff assert that the tax title to the coal is invalid.
Moreover ,the language of Section 78-12-5.1 makes
the resultant rule clear. It says:
". . . [W]ith respect to actions . . . to quiet title
. . . against the holder of a tax title to such property, no action . . . shall be commenced . . . more
than four years after the date of the tax deed . . .
creating such tax title unless the person commencing . . . such action . . . has actually occupied or
been in possession of such property within four
years prior to the commencement . . . of such
action." (Emphasis supplied.)
The issue in this action is Kanawha's claim of title, not
to the surface rights, but to the mineral rights. It is the
mineral right which is "such property" within the meaning of the statute and therefore, possession of the surface
is not possession of "such property" the title to which
Kanawha seeks to quiet.
The present facts present a particularly appropriate
case for the application of the statute. This is the case
of a coal company which for decades has consciously
chosen to pay no taxes on the coal title even though
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continuing the surface payments, and which has performed no possessory act in respect to the coal, which
has made no claim of ownership of the coal title until
suit was commenced nor any tender of the back taxes
on the coal, and which waited until after exploration by
another to assert a paper title. The statutory policy of
laying stale title claims to rest applies with special force.
Kanawha's "no severance" contention is unsound for
further reasons, based upon the facts of the present case.
The two titles, surface and coal, have for all years
involved been separately assessed. Such separate assessments result from provisions written into the Utah Constitution (Art. XIII, §11) and statutes (Sections 59-5-3
and 59-5-57, UCA 1953) which direct that coal rights
be assessed by the Tax Commission rather than the more
usual assessment of lands by local authorities. In this
context, Kanawha's predecessor intentionally effected a
total severance of the two titles. It deeded away the
surface, retaining the coal title. It chose not to pay the
coal tax. The recognition of the separation of the titles
has been refleced in its conduct ever since. The decision
not to pay the coal taxes was a decision consciously
taken, as appears from the pattern of continued payment
of all taxes on the surface. Its physical acts of possession,
since the severance, have solely related to the surface.
Moreover, the rule in Utah is that as to mineral
lands, possession of the surface is not of itself possession
of minerals. The Utah rule is in fact shown in the later
page of the annotation cited in Kanawha's brief, Acquisition of title to mines or minerals by adverse possession,
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35 ALR 2d 124. Kanawha mentioned the generalization
stated early in the annotation (quoted in its brief, page
6), but stopped too soon. A later section of the annotation, beginning at page 204 of 35 ALR 2d, shows the
Utah rule to be as stated here. Two Utah cases, not
mentioned by Kanawha, are discussed by the annotator.
These are Utah Copper Co. v. Chandler, 45 U 85, 142
P 1119 (1914) and Utah Copper Co. v. Eckmann, 47 U
165, 152 P 178 (1916). These cases involved lands in
the Bingham Canyon area which had been possessed,
as to the surface, by persons who had moved upon the
land, built thereon, and paid the general property taxes
assessed as to the surface. As to the minerals, the general
property taxes had been separately assessed to, and were
paid by, the mining company which was the grantee of
the patent granted by the federal government under the
general mining laws. This Court held that title to the
surface was owned by the surface possessors, and that
title to the underlying minerals was owned by the mining
company, thus holding that possession of the surface is
not possession of the underlying minerals. The holdings
of thes two Utah cases support the basic concept embodied in the lower court's ruling.
It follows that Kanawha's surface possession has
nothing to do with the possession of the coal title in the
circumstances of this case. Both in Utah law, and by
reason of the actual facts of this case, severance took
place. Surface possession does not affect the running of
the four-year period of limitations prescribed by law.
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POINT 2
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED, NOTWITHSTANDING
ITS ASSERTION OF CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION.

Kanawha's second point of argument is but a restatement in other terms of the first point. It is said that
Kanawha as record owner of the fee continues, presumptively, in possession of the coal title until the opposite is shown. Kanawha says: "Seisin once established
is presumed to continue until contrary is proved" (Brief
p. 9).
This generalization, for which support is sought in
general language appearing in cases borrowed from
other jurisdictions, does not apply. The matter is settled
in Utah by our four-year statute, Section 78-12-7.1, UCA
1953, which expressly provides the opposite of what
Kanawha contends:
Adverse possession—Presumption—Proviso—
Tax title. — In every action for the recovery or
possession of real property or to quiet title to or
determine the owner thereof the person establishing a legal title to such property shall be presumed to have been possessed thereof within the
time required by law; and the occupation of such
property by any other person shall be deemed to
have been under and in subordination to the legal
title, unless it appears that such property has been
held and possessed adversely to such legal title
for seven years before the commencement of such
action. Provided, however, that if in any action
any party shall establish prima facie evidence
that he is the owner of any real property under
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a tax title held by him and his predecessors for
four years prior to the commencement of such
action and one year after the effective date of
this amendment he shall be presumed to be the
owner of such property by adverse possession
unless it appears that the owner of the legal title
or his predecessor has actually occupied or been
in possession of such property under such title or
that such tax title owner and his predecessors
have failed to pay all the taxes levied or assessed
upon such property within such four year period.
The statute says that the County and Centennial,
its coal lessee, are presumed the owners in possession of
the coal title in the present circumstances. Kanawha
could overturn the presumption only if it had been in
actual possession of the coal (admittedly not the fact)
or if there were a failure by the County to pay, to itself,
any general property tax levied on the coal title (which
obviously Kanawha cannot show).
In the context of the present case, the generalizations quoted in Point II of Kanawha's brief are fatal
to its own position. Wholly apart from the tax title, the
legal titles to the two estates, surface and coal, have
for decades been treated separately, by all involved, in
respect to possessory acts, conveyancing, leasing, and
taxation. Kanawha's theory that its surface possession
amounted also to a legally presumed continuous possession of the coal is shown to be incorrect in the passage
from Thompson on Real Property which was partially
quoted by Kanawha. The full paragraph (Vol. 1A,
§165, p. 77), the first portion of which Kanawha omitted
(see p. 9), states:
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Where there has been a severance of owner
ship of the surface and minerals, the surface owner, in order to establish a claim to the minerals
through adverse possession, must establish possession of the mine, as such, independently of his
possession of the surface. His possession of the
mine must be actual, notorious, exclusive, continuous and hostile for the statutory period in the
same manner as a stranger. Actual possession is
shown by opening and operating the mine, and
the possession is continuous if the operation is
carried on at such seasons as the nature of the
work permits or the custom of the neighborhood
requires. It is not required that the act of ownership should be done every day or month or at any
definite intervals, but they should be of such frequency and character as would at all times apprise the owner that his seizin is being interrupted
and his title endangered.
Kanawha's effort is to turn the case upside down.
As plaintiff it cannot succeed by demanding proof that
it has been "dispossessed." On its own record, Kanawha
cannot prevail because the statute precludes it.
CONCLUSION
The four-year statute is a statute of repose. Its intention is to lay tax titles to rest where the claims against
them have become stale by the expiration of the specified period, and where as in this case the presale owner
has had absolutely no possession during the period.
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The lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
John W. Horsley
Joseph J. Palmer
and
James T. Jensen
Attorneys for Centennial
Development Company
Dan C. Keller
Attorney for Carbon County
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